Ataturk Reforms Possible

Ataturk Reforms PossibleAbstract Most studies on Ataturk Reforms focus on the intentions of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. Yet, the intentions al single do non explain how the repairs became thinkable. This paper alternatively looks at the conditions prevailing at the time of the mitigates. It shows that due to a variety of positionors, two domestic and inter kingdomal, the advance and the society stood in opposite relations in jokester the spring was exceptionally strong while the latter was seriously weakened and fragmented. The contingent nature of these conditions throws inquiry on the re-doability of Ataturk reforms elsewhere.Extremely impressed and overly excited, Bryan Wood soldiery speaks to his wife on the ph unmatchable. The topic is an Arab Prince, Nasir, he lately met for a business purpose. Having a PhD in economics from Cambridge, young, ambitious, and reformist, Nasir could be want Ataturk. So Bryan Woodman told her wife, the roughly he could say in expressing hi s taste for the Prince charming, Nasir. What does this symbolize, the mention of the name, Ataturk, in the m proscribedh of an unlikely figure, an energy specializer in a Geneva-based investment company, in a movie like Syriana? No one belike wonders and appargonnt movements the appropriateness of the name chosen to describe Nasir. For umpteen Ataturk satisfyms the perfect match for our jobs in the nerve centre East. He was well mannered, well dressed, and well enlightened, could speak French and k impertinent the Western ism and lifestyle in truth well. He could dance in the private gatherings and was a true gentleman to women, marrying and once. His policy-making actions even manifest better. Ataturk is an icon of all(prenominal)(prenominal)thing the West has wanted to export to the serenity of the world terra firma building, deposit building, republicanism, liberation of women. to a greater extent primally, he is the champion of laymanization. Therefore, in the post 9/11 world, the name, Ataturk, probably arouses even more than(prenominal) admiration for he did what is straightaway even unimaginable to many today. He abolished the caliphate, the symbol of semipolitical Islam, close upd in(p) ingest the madrasahs and shariah law courts, banned the Sufi br an opposite(prenominal)(prenominal)hoods, shiftd the Moslem law to a Western law, so and so forth. For many all other newfangledizers in the Middle East, from Gemal Abdel Naser of Egypt to Reza Shah of Iran failed simply because they could not become Ataturk enough in one way or another.Mustafa Kemal, or storiedly known as Ataturk, was an puff general, who became a stir of state of war protagonist as a commander in the Dardanelles in the First World War. The queen empire was on the losing side when the war ended and signed the treaty of Sevr, according to which the Turks were left with a small adult male of territory in Anatolia, all the former extensive queer lands bei ng divided among various affiliate countries. Therefore, when Mustafa Kemal Ataturk landed in Samsun in May of 1919, the country was under contradictory occupation. In the following leash years under his leadership what is now Turkey (except Hatay province) was cleargond off from foreign forces with a combination of war and diplomacy. Starting with the abolition of the sultanate in 1922, Ataturk then led a series of reforms, an heavy part of which was to rewrite the Turkish history. jibe to this, the young Republic of Turkey was truly like a phoenix, a legendary bird coming into being from the ashes. This ex officio attitude had three mutually reinforcing diachronic assertions. First, the new republic was a radical split up from the past, a novel and original state on its own. Second, the republic owed its existence to the genius of one-man, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. Third, and more importantly, the new republic denied any credit to the whiff period, claiming that she patr imonial nothing, but an extremely backward society from the past, implying furthermore whatever good present-day(a) Turkey now enjoys was all product of the new republic.And, it worked quite successfully. This new image of Turkey was well accepted at home, understandably because the new state propagated its official history with all kernel available state rituals, trail textbooks, national monuments, which were constructed to serve the myth of Mustafa Kemal as the sole prophet of the Turkish nation and national holidays, such(prenominal) as 19 May or 30 August, which ritualized the celebration and commemoration of important events. More amazingly perhaps, this new image of Turkey was wholeheartedly accepted abroad. It was probably best reflected in the image of Ataturk himself. Academicians and journalists akin have this image of Ataturk all over as a stubborn idealist, set only by ideas and ideals with no practical concern at all in other realities all around, a commit missi onary, who followed not his self-interest, but what he thought as good for his country, a miracle maker turning an Islamic country into a Western society, an extremely magnetic person, whose mystical aura, under which a whole nation united, still has an enduring effect over the central Turkish state institutions, especially, the army, an unbelievably and absolutely muscular figure, nothing but whose likes and dislikes determined the whole historical course of a nation. Thus in every comparison we, as scholars, intellectuals and journalists, made we created an Ataturk, a sort of a Feurbachian figure, who has all attributes we think our hopeless Middle East needs.No question Ataturk was a phenomenal transmitter between the West and Turkey of the formers institutions, lifestyle, and philosophy into the latter. And, he was quite successful in that. His legacy clearly marks Turkey off from the rest of the Islamic world. Without taking into answer for his reforms, it is almost impossib le to explain and understand, for example, the execute and associated problems of democratization in Turkey, contemporary Turkish-Kurdish problems, contemporary cores of ghostly belief and politics in Turkey, and Turkeys drive toward European Union.Having said that, all forms of unchecked wishful and romantic ideas about him entrust not help us to understand and, if possible, derive lessons from his example for our contemporary world. This paper is an attempt to bring Ataturk from the Olympus Mountain back on the ground, addressing more specifically the following question what made Ataturk reforms, apparently so radical, possible in the early 20th century Turkey? This has at least two immediate payoffs. First, academically, we pull up stakes have a frequently clearer understanding of an important historical period in the history of the Middle East. Second, practically, we go away be much more realistic about the do-ability of similar reforms elsewhere. The paper is organiz ed as follows. In the coming section I visit the scores proposed to account for Ataturk reforms. The underlying logic in these explanations is to show the possible intentions could motivate the reforms. The objection I raise in this paper is that understanding the intentions is not enough to explain the reforms. Rather we need analyze how conducive the conditions were to contract the reforms. Then, I discuss two conditions that were present in Turkey during the time of Ataturk reforms a strong state and an extremely weakened society and sacred biotic community.What Has Been Proposed?The following Ataturk reforms have been generally considered as touching religion and religious institutions in Turkey and as secularizing the Turkish state and society. Historically first introduced, major reforms came in March of 1924 the caliphate was abolished, (3 March), the madrasahs (3 March), the office of Sheikh al Islam (3 March), the ministry of religious affairs and pious foundations (3 M arch), and the sharia courts (8 March) closed down. A second major set of reforms came in November of 1925 hat reform and dress code were introduced (25 November), Sufi orders closed down and their activities banned (30 November). In October of 1926, the Swiss civil and the Italian penal codes were adopted. In November of 1928, the new Turkish alphabet, adopted from Latin alphabet, was introduced, replacing the Arabic one. And, finally, in November of 1934, religious nicknames and titles, such as, haci (one who went to pilgrimage), hafiz (one who memorized the Quran), hoca (religious teacher), molla (religious student), were banned.As to why Ataturk undertook these reforms, most explanations put forward the following simple story. Because he was extremely impressed by the West, Ataturk wanted to veer the Turkish state and society into something they had never been western, or modern or secular. For this to happen, he had to cut the ties to the Ottoman past, which had been Islamic. With this master project in mind, Ataturk introduced his reforms. Then, the whole explanation discusses how the aforementioned reforms contributed to the master project guiding Ataturks actions.Bernard Lewis The increase of Modern Turkey is probably the best study to be shown as exemplifying the explanations of this sort. Lewis signals this right at the beginning, in Preface saying the theme of this book is the emergence of a new Turkey from the spoil of the old. tho in Chapter VIII of the book, titled the Kemalist Republic, he sets out to explain the logic of Ataturk reforms, each reform being an attempt to break the ties with the past. For him, for example, transferring the keen from Istanbul to Ankara was an act against the new Turkeys past. For nearly five centuries Istanbul had been the capital of an Islamic empire Turkish Istanbul, with its mosques and palaces, its divines and courtiers Pera, the Levantine suburb these were intimately associated with the past And so a new capital was chosen, symbolizing and accentuating the counterchanges that were taking place. Likewise, the caliphate was the link with the past and with Islam. It was precisely for that reason that he Ataturk was determined to break it. Hat reform, banning the tall, red, challenging fez proclaiming at once his refusal to conform to the West and his readiness to depress his unimpeded brow before God, was vivid and profound, the forcible transference of a whole nation from one civilization to another. The alphabet reform, with which Mustafa Kemal was slamming a door to the past as well as opening a door to the future, destroyed the last symbol that bound her Turkey to the Orient and set her apart from the Western community of nations -the Arabic script.The Emergence of Modern Turkey was first published in 1961, in the heyday of modernisation school. More than forty years posterior, two Turkish scholars would still speak in the same linguistic communication. Mustafa Kemal and his supporters imagined a new state modeled on the fundamental principles and outlines of the European style national state. For them this required a cognitive and political negation of the old regime and an take inment of a new era. There have been flamboyant attempts in the same spirit. For example, Serif Mardin (1991), a famous Turkish sociologist-historian, argues that Ataturk disliked the Ottoman street, Mahalle, so much that his reforms eliminated the components of the Ottoman street in the new Turkish society. Likewise, Volkan and Itzkowitz (1984) claim, for example, that the alphabet reform reflected Ataturks psychological urge to free her mother, who was equated with the Turkish nation in his mind, from the forces of oppression, obscurantism, and superstition. Hence, the reform saved the nation, replacing the dead mother now, from the same devils.In contrast to this dominant, excessively idealistic view of Ataturk reforms, there have been, however sporadically move, studie s proposing alternative explanations grounded more in rationalism or in strategic circumstances of the period. Unlike the idealistic views approach of one-overarching explanation for all reforms, these studies analyze each reform on its own. A discussion of a few examples will suffice for our purpose here.Behind the adoption of the Swiss Civil code in 1926, for example, Dora G. Nadolski sees Turkeys desire to establish full control over its own legal system by destroying the last vestiges of the capitulatory system. Under this system, as G.L. Lewis puts it, foreigners were not subject to Turkish laws they paid no taxes, their houses and business premises were inviolable, and they could be arrested or deported only by order of their own Ambassadors. This system not only let foreign host forces to intervene in internal affairs of Turkey, thus challenging her sovereignty, but also privileged foreigners and non-Muslim Ottoman citizens, who took foreign passports, in the commercial l ife of Turkey. The capitulations were first abrogated in 1914 unilaterally. However, they were re-imposed again after the First World War to be re-abrogated in the treaty of Lausanne, now recognized by France and Britain. Nadolski (1977) argues that the annulment was still not clear. It was because the Mecelle, codification of the Sharia based on the Hanefite fiqh and replaced by the Swiss Civil code in 1926, was not itself a complete civil code for it did not contain that portion of the Sharia which treats procedures of family, marriage and inheritance. As a result, secular court systems would not be able to deal with cases related to these issues. This would remain as a possible venue for the foreign power to intervene in lawsuits involving non-Muslim foreigners in Turkey. In any case, Turkey was stimulate to adopt a Western law system for its nestlingities according to the treaty of Lausanne. Rather than keep a dual system, the new regime preferred a unitary legal system withi n its territories. In short, the adoption of Swiss Civil code meant the abandonment of the dual court system, religious and secular, final abrogation of the remaining vestiges of the capitulatory system, and the abolition of the Mecelle. How well did Turkey in implementing the Swiss Civil Code? The International intimacy of Legal Sciences met in 1955 to discuss this issue, and Hilmi Ziya Ulken summarizes the finding of the 937 articles of the Swiss Civil Code, only 335 by 1955 have been utilise effectively, that in the case of two-thirds of the articles no circumstances to which they are applicable have emerged. Surprisingly, the Swiss Civil Code, was scarcely implemented in two areas family law and land laws, two areas which almost all scholars single out as the Code turning the country truly into a Western or secular one. wherefore is there a discrepancy between the declared objective and the realized outcome? Here is not the place to speculate on the reasons. However, it is a n important question to answer because Turkeys performance in fact whitethorn indicate the pragmatism, not idealism, of Turkish rulers in adopting the Swiss Code. It should be also noted that there were minor changes introduced into the Swiss Code before adopted in Turkey. As noted by Gotthand Jaschke, one change is a telling one. The Code banned marriages between couples if they were milk-bred by the same woman (in Turkish, sut kardesleri), which was clearly from the Islamic law.For the alphabet reform, not only the Turkish reformers themselves but also a few scholars like Uriel Heyd (1954) and inconsiderate Tachau (1977) noted the inefficiency and the inability of the Arabic script to render Turkish words and expressions as correctly as possible. There are a few inefficiencies to be noted. First, there are no garners in Arabic script for certain sounds of Turkish, like p as p in put, j as g in mortgage, as ch in chat and . This problem was easy to solve for some other symbols, like for p, for j, , for stood for them. More serious problem was with the Turkish vowels. In Arabic vowels are not written. nonetheless for a native Arab speaker this may pose a trouble in cases where the endings of words change in accordance with grammatical functions they have in a specific sentence. Two factors alleviate the problem for native Arab speakers. First, Arabic is an extremely structured language. Second, there are basically three vowel sounds in Arabic. Turkish does not enjoy the same advantages. For example, there are eight vowels in Turkish, a as in a in father, e as e in red, as e in open, i as ee in beet, o as o in no, as e in her, u as oo in pool, and as u in nude. There were some introductions into the Ottoman script to represent the Turkish vowels, , , and used in the place of vowels. However, the solution was not complete for example, could be pronounced as either lu, l, lo or l, Finally, as li or l. In addition to the confusions that may arise wit h the vowels, there are not only letters in Arabic script that have no corresponding sound in Turkish, like and , but also quite a number of letters that are close enough that will sound like one sound to a native Turkish ear. For the example of this latter group, , , , and , all sound very close to the Turkish letter z as z in zip and very close to the Turkish letter t as t in top , , and , very close to the Turkish letter h as h in hot and very close to the Turkish letter s as s in sand. Therefore, in an age of the modern states educating their citizens en masse, the alphabet reform seems quite efficient step to take. In fact, literacy level rapidly increased in Turkey, which can be attributed in part to the alphabet reform.When we analyze each reform within its own particular context, paying(a) particular attention to domestic and international factors involved at the time of the reform, we face a rather distinct picture of Ataturk reforms, a different set of factors at wor k. For many this is not surprising because different paradigms, grounding the motivations of actors in different factors, be it idealistic or materialistic or individual-psychological or structural, are at work in different analyses. In this paper I neither offer another explanation, challenging the existing explanations of Ataturk reforms, nor visit the old flips among various paradigms. In fact, I firmly believe that this hand has been a regainthy one for our understanding of politics, therefore, should continue. Rather I want to offer here a complimentary analysis, focusing instead on the factors that affected the reformers opportunities, making the reforms possible.Why is this latter analysis important? Any analysis, just focusing on the motivations of Turkish rulers in introducing the reforms, suffers from at least two weaknesses. First, such an analysis portrays, either implicitly or explicitly, an image of Ataturk who was absolutely powerful and extremely magical. His pers onal wishes, likes and dislikes will matter more than any other reason. Not only logically, but also historically this is out of the question if we are not a sort of a Carlylian hero-worshipper. Any reading of his long speech, called Nutuk, delivered in 15-20 October 1927, will show conclusively that his part was not well established up until 1927. His speech later became the official Turkish historiography, in which Mustafa Kemal discredited not only the sultan in Istanbul, but also his former colleagues, who actually fought in the independence war, and emphasized his own role and the novelty and originality of the national movement he had led. Second, and more importantly, such an analysis will invite us to make more speculations on why some other reform suggestions, as logical as those already introduced and implemented, were not implemented or never introduced in the first place. The most notable example was Ataturks personal initiative to turkify the language of basic Islamic rituals, like adhan, preaching in the Friday prayer and the Quran recitation. In this vein, in the month of Ramadan in 1932, he visited Istanbul to make headway the recitation of the Quran in Turkish. He personally participated in the programs held in 22 January 1932 in Yerebatan Mosque, then in the Sultanahmet Mosque on 29 January of 1932. The most impressive program was held in Ayasofya mosque on 3 February 1932. Not only the Quran, but also the adhan was recited in Turkish, the whole program being aeriform in the radio. The final novelty was introduced on 5 February 1932, Ataturk personally asking Hafiz Sadettin Kaynak, who later became a famous composer, to deliver the Friday prayer preaching in Turkish, Kaynak wearing western clothes rather than traditional religious garbs. The adhan in Turkish had been successfully implemented until 1950 when the Democrat Party lifted the ban on the adhan in Arabic. In Turkey, preaching in the Friday prayers is still held in Turkish except for the final parts which are in Arabic. But, for reasons unknown to us, Ataturk simply did not pursue the idea of the Quran recitation further, devoting his time to the nicety of Turkish language from Persian and Arabic from then on.There were other reform potentials in Turkey. For example, the language of Islamic prayer, namaz, could also be turkified for there were suggestions along this line. In fact, in 1926 a certain imam of Goztepe Mosque in Istanbul, Celalettin Efendi, led the prayer in Turkish, upon which he was fired from the Directorate of Religious Affairs. But, apparently, Ataturk was not arouse in the idea for we do not know any attempt on his side to promote the prayer in Turkish. Ataturk also did not pursue the idea of banning the veil for women, which Reza Shah of Iran and King Emanullah of Afghanistan, both(prenominal) being contemporary of Ataturk, pursued in their countries. In fact when King Emanullah was overthrown, Ataturk was reported to say I warned him t o proceed slowly on the issue of womens veil. What Made Reforms Possible? Unlikely ConditionsLike any other politician, whose authority was not inherited, but obtained, Ataturk faced opposition at every stage from his landing in Samsun on. He was not alone in the leadership cadre of the independence movement. This can readily be seen through a comparative reading of memoirs, written by individuals like Kazim Karabekir, Halide Edip Adivar, Ali Fuat Cebesoy, Riza Nur, Rauf Orbay, who wrote their own narratives of the independence war in response to Ataturks Nutuk. In contrast to one-man leadership of Nutuk, these narratives show the agency and significance of a plurality of leaders and common people who took part in the Independence Struggle and the process of nation building in the twenties. Ataturk and his clique, therefore, competed with other political rivals both during and after the war of independence. During the war, for example, some former Unionists attempted to replace Must afa Kemal with Enver Pasha, Ottoman minister of war during the First World War. Only Ataturks successful command of the Turkish forces in the war of Sakarya killed the dreams of Enver Pasha. There was even more serious challenge to Mustafa Kemal and his clique in the Turkish parliament. There emerged a group in the parliament, consisting of 118 deputies opposing Mustafa Kemal, the remaining 197 deputies supporting him. After the war, Mustafa Kemal organized his supporters into a political party, the Peoples Party, and called for an election. The opponents could not organize into a single party and lost the elections. Out of 118 deputies only 3 could get into the second parliament. It was this second parliament, which declared Turkey as a republic and elected Mustafa Kemal as its president.Opposition to Mustafa Kemal even continued in the second parliament, now led by much more formidable opponents. In November of 1924, the first leaders of the independence war, Rauf Orbay, Refet Bel e, Ali Fuat Cebesoy, and Kazim Karabekir, commanding great reputation and respect both in the army and among the masses, formed an opposition party in the parliament. The party was joined by others, who resigned from Ataturks party. According to a calculation, the percentage of military officials in this party was 44 percent, in contrast to just 18 percent in Ataturks party. Especially, the Istanbul bureaucracy, who was not happy to lose their privileges with the shift of capital to Ankara, was behind Rauf Orbay, himself a war hero during the First World War. In the memoirs of these individuals one strongly feels how marginalized they saw themselves in the post-Ottoman Turkey by those, who joined the war of independence late yet were close to Ataturk. In the meantime, a massive Kurdish rising broke out in the Eastern Anatolia in February of 1925, giving Ataturk and his clique, controlling the government and the parliament, an prospect to accuse the opposition party of inspiring th e rebellion. The party was closed in June of 1925. One year later an assassination attempt on the life of Mustafa Kemal was thwarted in Izmir. An extra-ordinary court was formed, entirely run by the deputies of Ataturks party. The court ruled the execution of 19 former Unionists and jailed Rauf Orbay. Partly due to public outcry, Ali Fuat Cebesoy and Kazim Karabekir were released. Only after the trials ended, resulting in the complete exile from active political life of all possible political rivals, Ataturk and his clique could feel secure in their positions. As a side note, it is rumored that toward the end of his life, Ataturk wanted to heal the broken-hearts of his friends, but no meeting between him and his former colleagues and then rivals materialized as far as we know.An fire anecdote is illustrative of his approach toward dealing with the opposition. It was during the committee meetings in the Turkish parliament in 1922. The issue was whether to abolish the Sultanate or no t. The ulama members of the committee engaged in a hot scholarly debate about whether the caliphate and the sultanate could be separated. Enraged by these never ending debates, Mustafa Kemal interrupted the committee meeting and asked for leave to speak up. Granted, he bluntly said Sovereignty and Sultanate are not given to anyone by anyone because learning proves that they should be or through discussion or debate. Sovereignty and Sultanate are taken by strength, by power and by force. It was by force that the sons of Osman seized sovereignty and Sultanate of the Turkish nation they have maintained this misdemeanour for six centuries. Now the Turkish nation has rebelled, has put a stop to these usurpers, and has effectively taken sovereignty and Sultanate into its own hands. This is an accomplished fact -the question is merely how to give expression to it. This will happen in any case. If those gathered here, the assembly and everyone else could look at this question in a natural way, I think they would agree. Even if they do not, the truth will still find expression, but some heads may roll in the process, in the final sentence, waving his hand toward the members around their necks.Ataturk was indeed a man of his word, not failing to resort to force if his authority was challenged. And, as I briefly described above, his authority did not go unchallenged. Yet, there is a feature common to all opponents of Ataturk. They had no societal power base, their influence coming mostly from their positions in the state apparatus. The elimination of none of the potential rivals in fact led to massive protests from the society. Only Seyh Said rebellion, which broke out in 1925 in Eastern Anatolia, does not fit into this category. It was a massive rebellion, led by a Kurdish Nakshi Seyh. Yet, it is better to consider this rebellion not as a domestic opposition to Ataturk, but to the whole idea of Turkish state by the Kurdish populations in Eastern Anatolia.In this natur e of the opposition we can clearly see two important mutually reinforcing conditions, which, in my opinion, made the Turkish reforms possible. First, by the time Ataturk came to power, the Turkish state had already eliminated all possible societal power bases, thanks to the Ottoman modernization. The Ottoman modernization had been driven by the necessities of the international military environment. With Russia alone, the Ottomans fought four major wars in the 19th century in 1806-1811, 1828-1829, 1853-1856, and 1877-1878. inhering rebellions especially in the Balkans paralyzed the Empire throughout the same century. The Ottomans survival as an independent political entity depended among other things on the intricate working of balance of power. Territorial losses and commercial concessions followed up every defeat in the field, the magnitude of which ultimately depended on the will of other powers involved. Though severely shake by the tidal waves of every international military c onfrontation and internal problem, the Ottomans survived the 19th century.Against this background of ever-increasingly unpeaceful international environment, uninterruptedly from the period of Mahmud II (1808-1839) on, the Ottomans tenaciously pursued reforms by all available means in the military, the administration, state finance, education and the legal system. After abolishing the Janissaries in 1826, Mahmud II established a new army upon European model. The successive Ottoman statesmen later expanded the army in size and updated it with the newest technology. In this vein, the Empire heavily imported arms supplies from Germany, Britain and France. Thus, the Ottoman Empire became one of the most important markets for armaments in the world. The Ottoman statesmen also hired foreign military personnel in the army, opened new military colleges, modernized the new reforms, and introduced conscription. If exhausted all domestic resources, the Ottoman statesmen sought for external fin ancial resources from foreign governments and international financial institutions to continue the reforms. Eventually, the Ottoman government became so indebted that it declared bankruptcy in 1878, and deferred the collection of certain revenues to a European controlled institution, the Ottoman Public Debt Administration, in 1881.The success of the Ottoman modernization can be best seen in her performance in the First World War. The Ottoman Empire entered the war in November of 1914 on the side of the Central Powers. The Empire was the least populous and the most economically backward among the major powers of the war. In the words of a military historian, By 1914, the Ottoman Empire had locomote far behind the European Great Powers in every category of resources necessary for the conduct of modern war. Yet, the Empire fought in the war quite impressively. By far superior, Russia could not finish the war and succumbed into a revolution in 1917. Only when it became evident that the Germans lost the war, the Ottomans stopped fighting. As late as 1917 in the war, the Ottomans were still holding the southern frontiers against the British and the French. During the World War, the Ottoman Empire could broadcast more than two million troops, and could fight in five frontiers spreading over a vast area. The state could mobilize all resources of the country for the war efforts, not only through forceful means, but also through voluntary organizations.The strengthening of the state went in tandem with the weakening of other societal institutions. In fact, the Ottoman modernization truly started after Mahmud II eliminated two powerful groups in the Ottoman society the janissaries and the topical anesthetic strong families, or the ayans. The bloody suppression of Seyh Said rebellion in 1925 was a part of this process of demilitarizing the society, by and large completed among the Turkish populations by the 1920s and was to be completed among the Kurdish populations by the end of the 1930s. Religious institutions also weakened in the face of ever-strengthening Turkish state. This was natural because the Ottoman modernization did not remain within the field of military, but spilled out into education and legal system, two strongholds of religious institutions. Neither Mahmud IIs reforms nor later reforms in fact meant a frontal attack on the privileges of the religious institutions. The Ottoman reforms did not eradicate all livelihoods of the Sunni Ulema instead they created a new space for the newly educated classes in parallel existence with the one existing for the Ulema. Religious courts and schools continued to work alo